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Jari Eloranta, Peter Hedberg, Maria Cristina Moreira, and Eric Golson 
The history of trade and conflicts for the last 300 years is typically a story of great 
powers and great men (and occasionally women), where the smaller states are usually 
referred to in footnotes. It is, after all, a common assumption that smaller geographic 
size, or some other indicator of perceived weakness, connotes limited power and 
importance in the “big picture”. In this volume the authors challenge this view. In 
fact, we would argue that smaller/weaker states have had crucial roles to play in 
history, especially during conflicts. As warfare has become more consuming, conflicts 
bigger and deadlier, and more and more of a country’s resources are used up in order 
to win the war, smaller/weaker states have been able to take advantage of the 
economic opportunities that conflicts can offer. It is, of course, true that smaller 
nations can end up on the receiving end of military aggression, but in our view they 
have also been very adept at maneuvering during conflicts, thereby avoiding invasion 
and direct participation in the war. Thus, we are calling here for greater attention to be 
paid to the middle and small powers in world history and suggesting that a 
preoccupation with the study of great powers can distort our view of the nuanced 
dimensions of conflicts and trade. After all, networks and alliances have always been 
crucial in warfare, and they have worked only if everyone contributed. 
The aim of this edited volume is thus to provide a novel take on the history of 
conflicts and trade, with a clear focus on the role of small/medium, or “weak”, and 
often neutral states. This volume spans a crucial period in history, namely, from the 
18th century with its great power expansion revolutions to the world wars and the 
Cold War of the 20th century, i.e., crucial periods of change in the concept and 
practice of neutrality and trade, as well as periods of transition in the nature and 
technology of warfare. The key findings from the case studies included in this volume 
emphasize that these states played a much bigger role in world and bilateral trade than 
has previously been assumed, and that this role was augmented by the emergence of 
truly global conflicts and total war. In general, we want to explore what kinds of 
short- and long-run changes we see in the trade flows between the great powers and 
weaker states during these centuries, especially whether the pressure of a war effort 
allowed more latitude for these states to explore their trade options or enhanced their 
bargaining power or market position. Many of the smaller/weaker states were neutral 
during parts or all of the major conflicts of the period and served as important 
conduits for key strategic and other goods. The basic argument in most of the chapters 
here is that weak states were able to expand their trade and discover new markets 
during the large and protracted conflicts, which more and more characterized this 
period, due to the industrialization of war. 
In what follows, we first discuss the study of smaller/weaker states, state power, 
and conflicts. After this, we provide an overview of some of the perspectives on the 
study of trade, as well as the macro-indicators of trade over time. The big changes in 
the last 300 years involve the rise and fall of powerful states (and the less powerful), 
the massive increases in world trade, especially since the globalization and 
industrialization of the 19th century; increases in the scale and scope of conflicts; and 
the global increases in living standards. None of these processes has been steady or 
even, and thus they have created winners and losers. We conclude this introduction 
with a review of the chapters and raise some points about the future research 
challenges. 
Weak states, state economic/political power, and conflicts 
Given our strong assertions about smaller/weaker states, it is useful to discuss what 
we mean by this term. A state that occupies a “small” geographic area is not 
necessarily weak (consider Great Britain), while on occasion states of wide 
geographic extent (such as China in the 19th century) need not be strong. In the 
present volume we focus our analysis primarily on states that had limited economic 
and/or military power.1 Thus, for example, the United States in the 18th century was 
clearly a weak state, whereas the USA that emerged after World War II was most 
certainly not. In this section we explore different ways of estimating the power of a 
state, and also how many conflicts we have seen in this period, roughly from the mid-
18th century to the Cold War, and what kinds they were. 
Here the definition of weak states is not the same as that of failing states, i.e., states 
which cannot contain internal violence and repression, such as is used in the recent 
literature on state formation.2 Our approach is more akin to that of Michael Handel, 
who argues that even countries with a large area can be weak, in the sense that they 
are weak players in the international system. Typically, according to him, a weak state 
tends to have a small population and area, low GNP, a small and specialized domestic 
market, high dependence on foreign military protection, and limited potential to 
influence the international system.3 In Jari Eloranta’s earlier work, weak states are 
presented as perhaps overly dependent on external trade, with fewer policy constraints 
on domestic trade apparatus, and differing from one another on the basis of 
geographic and strategic impulses.4 Moreover, they can have significant options in the 
global or regional system depending on the relations between them and the great 
powers and the characteristics of the hegemonic system. As Robert Gilpin and Paul 
Kennedy, among others, point out, systems dominated by hegemonic powers can be 
more peaceful than others, since other powers cannot challenge them, thus leaving 
room for smaller/medium powers to gain from the economic and political networks.5 
There is, of course, a large literature on state capacity in history, and it is a 
particularly lively field in economic history.6 An equally large literature has been 
devoted to the evolution of fiscal states and fiscal transformations in history.7 Many of 
these topics intersect when it comes to analyzing the long-run formation of states, 
typically in Europe, usually via fiscal expansion impacted by conflicts.8 The scholars 
working on state capacity have overwhelmingly used fiscal data – for example, 
revenue collection and tax analysis – to gauge a state’s ability to establish a monopoly 
of the violence inside its borders. Usually the analysis of conflicts brings in the ability 
to use public debt as a tool to finance them and shows how the burden of debts 
affected state formation.9 Here our focus is not on the growth and evolution of fiscal 
capacity, but on military capacity and the level of engagement in trade. We 
particularly want to compare and contrast the position of smaller/weaker states with 
that of the great powers. Finally, we want to emphasize that the power position of 
states changed over time, and we want to see if this also holds for smaller/weaker 
states. 
One way to analyze the power position and ranking of states has been to use the 
so-called CINC (Composite Index of National Capacity) scores, especially in the 
conflict and peace science research since the 1970s. This index consists of total 
population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military 
personnel, and military expenditure, all from 1816 onwards.10 This index is useful in 
forming a macro-picture of power relations over time, but it also has some 
weaknesses. First, it can overestimate the perceptions of power versus actual capacity. 
Second, some of the components can be critiqued, such as the inclusion of two 
population variables and the lack of GDP (per capita) as a component, especially 
since more and more of these data are available for the post-1816 period.11 Still, the 
CINC scores are a decent starting point for our analysis here. 
<<Table 1.1 HERE>> 
Table 1.1 
Composite Indices of National Capabilities (CINC), 1865–1950, as shares (%) of UK 
CINC 
 1865 1880 1895 1913 1925 1938 1950 
BRA 2.73 4.13 5.23 9.73 11.46 12.82 21.31 
DEN 1.56 1.38 1.74 1.77 2.08 2.56 3.28 
FRA 43.36 49.54 51.74 60.18 62.50 58.97 54.10 
GER 25.39 48.62 73.26 126.55 85.42 197.44 — 
NOR 0.78 1.83 1.16 2.65 3.13 3.85 0.00 
POR 1.95 2.29 2.33 2.65 4.17 3.85 3.28 
SWE 4.30 5.05 5.23 6.19 6.25 6.41 8.20 
NED 3.13 4.13 4.65 6.19 7.29 6.41 13.11 
UK 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
USA 52.73 57.34 97.67 194.69 264.58 219.23 465.57 
Sources: National Material Capabilities data 5.0, based on methods developed in 
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972).  
Note 
BRA = Brazil, DEN = Denmark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER =Germany, 
NED = Netherlands, NOR = Norway, POR = Portugal, SWE = Sweden, SWI = 
Switzerland, UK=United Kingdom, and USA=United States of America.  
Note 
We use the period from 1865 onward to make these figures comparable with the naval 
tonnage data noted later in this chapter. 
Based on the CINC scores, Brazil, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands were fairly consistently weak powers in the period summarized in Table 
1.1. France and the UK appear to have been declining great powers, while the USA 
was an ascending power, especially after World War I. Germany’s power status 
waxed and waned in the period; in the 1920s, for example, it was a weak great power. 
Military spending is more naturally taken as a comparative instrument of a state’s 
(military) capacity. However, it too is imperfect, since the COW-database figures 
have been converted to pounds sterling or dollars using exchange rates. Another 
option would be to come up with the percentage share of military spending in respect 
of GDP, often called the military burden. However, the data for all these countries are 
not available, so we have opted here to use the COW figures. However, we treat them 
as a percentage share of the world’s military spending total (= all COW military 
expenditures summed annually).12 
<<Table 1.2 HERE>> 
Table 1.2 
Military spending of select nations as a share of the world’s military spending (%), 
1865–1950 
 1865 1880 1895 1913 1925 1938 1950 
BRA 1.44 1.59 1.34 1.42 1.08 0.27 0.75 
DEN 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.28 0.21 0.11 0.12 
FRA 16.78 19.95 15.83 11.27 7.13 4.40 3.34 
GER 4.19 11.79 13.60 14.94 3.25 35.45 — 
NOR — — — 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.11 
POR 1.38 1.59 1.40 0.90 0.39 0.24 0.23 
SWE 0.60 0.77 0.90 0.77 0.93 0.35 0.49 
NED 1.30 1.68 1.34 0.74 0.85 0.36 0.53 
UK 14.76 13.04 15.74 11.45 12.74 8.91 5.33 
USA 21.45 6.94 6.69 10.62 12.95 5.41 32.64 
Source: National Material Capabilities data 5.0, based on methods developed in 
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972).  
In the late 19th century, the only great powers shown in Table 1.2 were the UK and 
France – the United States had a high military spending share in 1865 only because of 
the impact of the Civil War, and in subsequent years this share was much smaller. The 
medium powers here were Germany and the USA, and both were ascending to the 
status of great powers by 1913, Germany in particular. In the interwar period those 
rankings changed, and on the eve of World War II Germany was the only military 
superpower among this group. After the war, it was the USA. The military spending 
“strength” of the weak powers here did not change very dramatically during the 
period, although they show a clear trend toward lower relative spending after World 
War I. 
The great leaps in the extension of historical national accounts in the last 40 years 
have made it possible to look at the relative positions of these states in the 19th and 
20th centuries, and sometimes, as in the cases of the UK and Sweden, for longer.13 
GDP is one way to measure the overall economic capacity, and it is particularly well 
suited for comparisons of the great powers and their ability to prevail in a conflict. 
However, for example, GDP per capita is in many ways a better measure than the 
CINC score, since it describes concisely a state’s total economic capacity and its 
potential for mobilization during a conflict. Moreover, it takes into account the size of 
the population, which can, when large, be both a positive (numbers available for 
military service, ability to mobilize, ability to sustain losses) and a negative (being 
hard to control, with potential for revolution, cost to a sovereign of appeasing a large 
population). At least it gives us another way to analyze state capacity in a comparative 
way. 
<< Table 1.3 HERE >> 
Table 1.3 
Real GDP per capita (in 2011 USD), 1800–1950 





















BRA 600 16 600 34 606 43 1549 84 8316 72 
FIN 827 13 1035 23 1813 24 5208 22 32972 23 
FRA — — 2028 11 4214 12 6869 15 31771 26 
GER 958 11 1386 18 4596 9 5536 20 33975 19 
NOR — — 1562 15 3813 14 7947 12 54594 4 
POR 1330 7 1226 22 1729 25 2771 48 21497 37 
SWE 1151 9 1446 16 3438 15 8816 9 36374 13 
SWI — — 2333* 7* 5124 6 9053 8 42752 7 
UK 2205 1 2858 1 5608 5 9441 6 34390 18 
USA 1980 3 2825 2 6252 1 15241 1 45887 5 
Source: Maddison Project Database, version 2018. See Inklaar, de Jong, Bolt, and van 
Zanden (2018). The figures are in 2011 USD, based on multiple benchmarks.  
Note 
BRA = Brazil, FIN = Finland, FRA= France, GER = Germany, NOR= Norway, POR 
= Portugal, SWE = Sweden, SWI = Switzerland, UK = United Kingdom, and USA =  
United States of America. 
* = for Switzerland, the value is the 1851 figure, the earliest data point. 
The selected countries are analyzed in Table 1.3 in terms of both their real GDP 
per capita (as potential for mobilization) and rank in global comparisons. First, 
however, we must note that the rankings take account of the fact that few countries 
had any data for the early part of the period, and that they do not say anything about 
the absolute size of the economy. If we start with the UK and the USA, the former 
unquestionably experienced a decline in the 20th century, similar to the pattern 
apparent from previous tables. The United States ascended to the top and held on to 
this position until the late 20th century. France also declined toward the late 20th 
century. Germany, in its turn, ascended in the early 20th century, but then dropped to 
the same rank as it occupied for most of the period. Of the smaller/weaker states, 
Brazil evinced little progress, and in fact declined in rank. The Nordic countries 
remained at similar levels, relatively speaking, with some rise in the ranks, notably by 
Norway. 
Another way to assess a state’s military capacity more effectively is to analyze its 
military capacity as a stock. Scholars have in the past used the number of battleships 
as a measure of state capacity, which favors the great powers.14 Naval tonnage is a 
better way to gauge naval capacity, and a new dataset offers us a way also to take into 
account proportional naval power.15 Figure 1.1 provides us with the great power 
patterns, and Figure 1.2 what happened to some of the smaller/weaker states. 
Unsurprisingly, the UK dominated the waves until World War I. Afterwards, it had 
close to parity with the USA. The latter country’s performance in this comparison is 
quite surprising – typically scholars do not consider the US a major naval power, at 
least until World War II. But the interwar naval treaties limited naval buildup to a 
degree in any case. France was a declining naval power for most of the period, while 
Germany was ascending (yet unable to challenge most of the others) until the interwar 
period. These comparisons may change our perceptions of power in the period, 
although the trends are somewhat similar to the other indicators used above. 
Regardless of these patterns, we have to acknowledge that having large battleships, 
submarines, and later aircraft carriers was vital for global dominance such as UK in 
the 19th century and US in the 20th. From this perspective, the US was less 
impressive before World War II. In 1860, the American navy had only five ships of 
the line, whereas the UK had 76.16 
In turn, the patterns for the weaker states were extremely varied. For example, 
Brazil was a substantive naval power in the latter part of the 19th century, with levels 
on par at times with the US and Germany. Portugal and Norway were fairly similar, 
with a lowering trend from 1900 onwards, and Sweden increased its naval power in 
the early 20th century, following Brazil’s development in the interwar period. The 
naval power indices of the weaker powers were around 10–15 percent of the totals of 
the major powers. It appears that the weaker powers were not a uniform group but 
more a set of groups, which then followed similar trends, most probably due to 
external influences (conflicts, markets, etc.). 
Figure 1.1 
Total proportional tonnage of France, Germany, UK, and USA, 1865–1950. 
 
Source: Crisher and Souva (2014). 
Figure 1.2 
Total proportional tonnage of Brazil, Portugal, Norway, and Sweden, 1865–1950. 
 Source: Crisher and Souva (2014).  
 
One of the key external conditions that affected all the states in the global trading 
system was conflict. While the 19th and 20th centuries saw fewer conflicts overall – 
in fact, the “long 19th century” from 1815 to 1914 saw few of them – they were 
deadly centuries. The world wars were, of course, the deadliest conflicts; they 
developed into global total wars, something that had begun with the wars of the 
French Revolution and Napoleonic conflicts. These total wars, which were relatively 
rare, involved all elements of society, and typically also offered new opportunities for 
neutral and smaller states, due to the resource needs of the belligerents.17 
Figure 1.3 
Total deaths (military and civilian) from conflicts, 1750–1950. 
 Source: Conflict Catalog (Violent Conflicts 1400 AD to the Present in Different Regions of the World), 
retrieved from www.cgeh.nl/data#conflict (cited February 10, 2018). 
As Figure 1.3 shows, the long-run trends in war fatalities, military and civilian, 
hardly decreased from the 1750s to 1945. There was a slight decline in the early 19th 
century, then an increase in the mid-century, and more fluctuation and increases due 
to the world wars. Since the Conflict Catalog figures are still somewhat incomplete, 
we also decided to confirm the results with the COW data, as shown in Figure 1.4. 
From 1823, the data show many annual fluctuations and apparently a slightly 
increasing trend toward the late 19th century and then into the 20th. The biggest jump 
came with World War I, and then the interwar period. There is certainly no reduction 
in conflict-related violence. 
Figure 1.4 
Total battle deaths, 1823–1950. 
 Source: Inter-State War Data, ver. 4.0. See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010). Please note that this 
database starts in 1816, and the first observations are from 1823 onward. 
Importance of the study of trade and neutrality 
Since the 17th century, major wars have recurrently been accompanied by declining 
international commerce.18 There are several reasons for this. Developments in 
communications and societal organization have enabled more efficient mobilization 
for war while increasing the production capacity of states has entailed mass 
production of war materials, population growth has provided for larger armies, and 
advances in weaponry have worsened the adverse impact of wars on the economy 
over time. In addition to tragic losses of lives, numbers of wounded, and ruined 
material resources, wars and conflicts have persistently distorted markets and 
disrupted trade. Moreover, and of great importance to this book, after the turn of the 
18th century, naval warfare and blockades have been employed and more vigorously 
enforced than before. The power of a country is typically related to its wealth, i.e., 
resources buy guns und munitions, foodstuffs, and raw materials, and commodities, 
which are required to provide for military as well as civilian needs. For this reason, 
belligerent countries have regularly made efforts to control trade channels, either to 
benefit from trade in order to increase their wealth, or to deprive the enemy of their 
resources.19 
Belligerent countries commonly have accounted for the largest market distortions 
and trade disruptions. A great number of powers that have waged war against each 
other have been leading trading nations and each other’s major trading partners, and 
as they have targeted each other the naval warfare and blockade policies of belligerent 
powers have frequently entailed losses of major markets. Consequently, the decline in 
the trade of belligerent countries has been strongest.20 This has opened up 
opportunities for other nations to fill the void. 
Moreover, the impact of wars and conflict on the economy has commonly 
stretched far and deep beyond belligerent countries.21 Since the 18th century, trade 
and integration has increased on a global level. As a result, an increasing number of 
countries have depended on international trade for their economic growth and 
development and have thus been increasingly vulnerable to disruptions of 
international trade and commerce. The larger the trading nations and the more 
vigorous naval warfare has been, the stricter the blockade that has been enforced. In 
addition, this has resulted in greater market distortions, and as a result the costs of 
trade have increased. The costs from market distortions and declining international 
commerce and trade have sometimes exceeded the direct costs from battle-related 
casualties and material destruction.22 For this reason, the resulting decrease in world 
trade volumes has been assumed to affect both belligerents and non-belligerents – 
neutral countries – negatively.23 
However, as is presented in this book, there are ample examples of neutral 
countries that have benefitted from the changing political and economic conditions 
brought on by wars and conflicts.24 Neutral maritime trade and wars have coexisted 
since at least the 18th century, and since then commercial activities of neutral 
countries have not been as restricted as the belligerents’. While international trade and 
commerce has declined, the importance of access to alternative markets and the role 
of neutral trade conversely has increased.25 As a result, neutral countries have had 
opportunities to profit from international wartime demand. Even though such 
expansions have been temporary – as hostilities eventually have ceased and 
international commerce have been resumed – they sometimes have entailed long-term 
positive impact on trade and GDP growth.26 When the trade between belligerent 
countries has diminished due to naval warfare and blockades, neutral countries have 
often managed to maintain old and develop new channels for international commerce. 
In this respect, expanding wartime trade of neutral countries has mitigated the 
negative impact of conflicts and wars on the economy in general. 
Figure 1.5 
Estimates of the economic dimensions of early modern shipping, 1450–1800 vs. ships 
passing the Danish Sound, 1634–1857. 
 
Source: van Zanden and van Tielhof (2009). On the Sound Toll records, see www.soundtoll.nl. (cited 
January 5, 2018).27 
Typically the beginning of the first era of globalization is placed in the early 19th 
century, which also implies an immense growth in trade and shipping.28 As Figure 1.5 
shows, the scale and scope of shipping increased (see the Dutch case) for centuries 
before the start of globalization in the 19th century, though others have challenged the 
view that it began even as late as this.29 We also plotted the total number of ships that 
passed through the Danish Sound, which can be interpreted similarly, as an almost 
continuous growth trend in North European trade since the early 18th century.30 
Smaller nations were the key players in the trade passing through the Sound, and they 
certainly joined in this expansion. 
Figure 1.6 
Index of world trade, 1800–1938 (1913 = 100) vs. ships passing the Danish Sound, 1634–
1857. 
 Sources: Federico, Giovanni; Tena Junguito, Antonio (2018a), "Federico-Tena World Trade Historical 




The two indices were equalized at the year 1800. 
Figure 1.6 puts this in the context of 19th- and 20th-century trade, using the latest 
data from Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena Junguito. It also gives the impression 
that the trade expansion in the 19th century may have been a continuation of an earlier 
pattern, albeit possibly timed later. Whether it was or not, the huge growth in trade in 
the 19th century is clearly impressive. The dips in the pattern show the effect of 
World War I and the 1930s Depressions. 
The same database provides an overview of some of the costs of doing trade, 
namely freight rates. As earlier studies have suggested, freight rates declined in the 
19th century, with the exception of a temporary bump in mid-century due to the 
Crimean War.31 World War I shows up as a massive peak, and so do the late 1930s. 
These results were confirmed by another data series and seem to match well. The 
decline in costs of course benefited all the states, and especially those with large 
merchant (and military) fleets. 
Figure 1.7 
Global freight rates, 1800–1938. 
 
Sources: Federico, Giovanni; Tena Junguito, Antonio (2018b). ‘Federico-Tena World Trade Historical 
Database: Freights rates”, doi:10.21950/LAFKWD, e-cienciaDatos, V; and Mohammed and 
Williamson (2004).  
Note 
The Federico–Tena Junguito freights were combined into an arithmetic mean. 
Figure 1.8 
World trade openness (= Exports/GDP), 1800–1938. 
 
Source: Federico, Giovanni; Tena Junguito, Antonio (2018c). "Federico-Tena World Trade Historical 
Database: Openness", doi:10.21950/BBZVBN, e-cienciaDatos, V1. See also Federico and Tena-
Junguito (2017). 
What about trade openness, which we have hypothesized as perhaps being a 
characteristic of a smaller/weaker nation? As seen in Figure 1.8, such openness 
increased above all in Europe, as a consequence of a network of free trade treaties 
later in the century. In the world as a whole, the increase was less pronounced, and the 
Americas remained more protectionist. World War I marked the end to this era of 
relative trade openness. But how do the smaller/weaker states fit into this picture? 
Figure 1.9 shows some of the states discussed in this book. Some countries, such as 
Brazil and Switzerland, were very open economies in this period, Sweden less so but 
increasingly between the wars. Portugal and the United States were not very open at 
all, and their dependence on foreign markets was low. Existing and former colonies 
helped the former to keep its economy fairly completely closed off, while the latter, in 
contrast with most of Europe, was fairly protectionist in the late 19th century, 
Figure 1.9 
Trade openness (= Exports/GDP) for select weak powers, 1800–1938. 
 
Source: Federico, Giovanni; Tena Junguito, Antonio (2018c). "Federico-Tena World Trade Historical 
Database: Openness", doi:10.21950/BBZVBN, e-cienciaDatos, V1. See also Federico and Tena-
Junguito (2017). 
. 
Moreover, several of the chapters in this book examine the concept of neutrality, 
which small states have used as a way of avoiding direct conflict. Neutrality has long 
been seen as impartiality in war and is codified in international law as part of the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions.32 Although we have used this word across the 
chapters to describe how countries avoid conflict, the individual cases differ widely: 
consider Finland in the Cold War; Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and others in 
World War II; all the Scandinavian countries in World War I. Neutrals have 
maintained their independence by offering economic and political concessions to the 
belligerents to make up for their absolute and relative smallness. Cooperation allows 
them to survive, but still to oppose the regimes against when they were ideologically 
hostile. However, despite their different starting places, challenges across a wide time 
period, and unique political and economic threats, the instances of neutrality 
mentioned in this work show a number of similarities. The credibility of this defense 
was tested in many areas; in this work we explore the trade and business effects of 
neutrality, particularly in Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula. 
The argument presented in the chapters on neutrals in this book is developed on 
two discrete planes. The first area is explored in order to provide an economic history 
of small, neutral countries. In each conflict across the neutral case studies, trade is an 
area where neutrals were consistently threatened. Each of the chapters details 
elements of the trade and financial relations between the belligerent and neutral 
countries. Depending on the threats they faced, the neutrals cooperated to ensure their 
survival. Specific chapters also look at economic and business performance in light of 
the threats faced. These show how closely the neutral countries and businesses were 
affected by the war, but also how in the postwar periods they had a strategic 
advantage over competing firms, because of actions taken during the war. 
The second area of inquiry is investigated in order to describe the bilateral relations 
between nations and the negotiations they engage in. As part of this process, powerful 
belligerents or groups of belligerents seek to influence neutral behavior – whether 
between Portugal and Russia in the late modern period, the Western alliance 
introducing an embargo on Finland during the Cold War to minimize the leakage of 
trade through Finland to the Soviet bloc, or the German and British embargos on 
Sweden during World Wars I and II. In the last two cases, informal cooperation with 
the Anglo-sphere existed; at each turning point in the various wars, Finland and 
Sweden had to provide evidence of cooperation to placate the belligerent parties. 
Although many of the themes are the same, one strength of this volume is that the 
several chapters on small states and neutrality address a number of different cases to 
refine the concept of small state neutrality. For example, the trade and commercial 
relations between Portugal and Russia between 1770 and 1850 demonstrate the 
misalignment in trade aims due to problematic institutions and conflict. Norwegian 
neutrality in the Western blockade of Germany in World War I shows how vulnerable 
Norway became over time because of its unwillingness to negotiate in certain areas. 
In comparison, the business performance in Sweden during World War I of ball 
bearings manufacturer SKF displays how business can adapt to changing conditions 
during war. The macroeconomic effects of neutrality in the Nordic countries during 
the two world wars comparatively demonstrate a significant export improvement in 
the early years of World War I, but losses thereafter. 
The lessons here show that neutrality was a tool used more and more by weaker 
states over time, but also that it was not always respected by the other players. The 
more important the output of the smaller state, and the greater their power to provide 
access to markets that were otherwise difficult for the belligerents to access, the more 
their neutrality status was respected. In such situations the weaker states could take 
advantage of the gaps in the limited wartime markets. These states could also operate 
between the confines of formal trade agreements, which were in any case abandoned 
during certain conflicts. In times of war their merchant fleets represented important 
conduits; and if they maintained enough of a military deterrent, their neutrality status 
was even more likely to be respected. 
Contributions of the volume 
The chapters in Part I, which focuses on the long-run interactions between trade and 
conflicts for smaller/weaker states, shed light on the reciprocal effects between war, 
or times of conflict, and trade. In Chapter 2, Eloranta, Land, and Moreira analyze the 
trading practices and trends for the United States from the beginning of its de facto 
independence, through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and all the way to the 
period of peace in 1830 – during this time, the US was a new and weaker state. This is 
a longitudinal analysis of U.S. trade flows and behavior over a period that includes 
several conflicts and provides a fresh perspective on the role of the US as weak 
political actor. The economic impacts of war on trade are explored here, as well as the 
role of neutral and/or weaker states during such times, together with the pressure of 
the war efforts and whether they allowed more latitude for the US and other states to 
explore their trade options. Were there any changes in the types of goods traded over 
this complex period and, if so, what was the impact of the changes? Did economic 
and business concerns override political and diplomatic obstacles in these trade 
relations, and how did they open up opportunities for the smaller/weaker states? This 
chapter explores these points and argues that weak states, albeit briefly, were able to 
expand their trade and discover new markets even though they faced such large and 
protracted conflicts. 
Silvia Marzagalli’s contribution (Chapter 3) provides an evaluation of the role of 
American shipping and trade in the Mediterranean during the French Wars, and she 
shows how a country such as the United States could make the most of its situation 
and the wars in Europe to explore this trading area to its advantage. This chapter also 
underlines the relevance of guarantees for the United States’ trade and the chance to 
take advantage of neutrality through peace treaties, commercial treaties, and 
consulates in major ports. According to Marzagalli's findings, American shipping into 
the Mediterranean increased five to six times from the early 1790s to 1807, part of the 
trade being with belligerents. The United States’ ease in handling belligerents’ 
property relativized the notion of neutrality, giving it more flexibility and making it a 
system in constant evolution, rather than a fixed legal status. Despite the obstacles 
faced by the ships’ crews, they still seized the chance to expand the country's stay in 
the Mediterranean and travel further east. 
In Chapter 5, Dominguez and Carrara bring out a Brazilian historiographic 
panorama over the last three decades, following trade and taxation as a main conduit 
and depicting the establishment and consolidation of the two schools of thought 
regarding Brazil’s economic history. In addition, the writers analyze the former 
Portuguese colony’s fiscal capacities before and during the Napoleonic Wars, 
exploring in particular the case of Rio de Janeiro’s supremacy over other major local 
provinces and Lisbon at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th. 
Moreira, Sousa, and Scheltjens’ study of the commercial relations between 
Portugal and Russia (Chapter 4) analyzes the trade patterns and finance between these 
two countries. They explore the commercial changes in the relations between these 
two markets and focus on the Baltic Sea region in the context of the major 
international changes between 1770 and 1850 entailed by the new global war, and on 
neutrality and peace, in particular after the American War of Independence and the 
Napoleonic War. This study also points out that the difficulties of navigation, 
organization, and finance for Portuguese trade are important variables in explaining 
the absence of Portuguese merchants from this region’s commercial relations. 
Chapter 6, by Hedberg and Häggqvist, covers how a neutrality stance was adopted, 
especially by Sweden, following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Its origins were 
closely connected to foreign trade, where neutrality was a tool for the country to keep 
trade links open and to attempt to direct shipping through Swedish ports. This chapter 
examines Swedish foreign trade, shipping and wartime trade policy strategies during 
the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, and World War I. Sweden was able to take 
advantage of its neutral position during these three wars to increase trade and 
shipping, but it also adjusted its trade policy as a result of the circumstances of war 
and the encompassing neutrality. The short- and long-run effects of these wars on 
trade policy are discussed. 
In comparison, the chapters in Part II, which focuses on the impact of conflicts on 
trade and neutrality (and vice versa), open the door to in-depth analyses of conflict-era 
trade and neutrality. In Chapter 7, on neutrality and conflicts, Eric Golson contributes 
to the understanding of the origins of neutrality and its legal framework, linking it 
with a framework from economic history, namely, the analysis of trade, labor, and 
capital for small states and neutrals in times of conflict. He approaches the subject of 
neutrality by briefly discussing the concept in legal terms and describes how different 
scholars have viewed its evolution. This introduction leads to the legal codification of 
neutrality in legal conventions, providing a framework for the definition of 
relationships between states. However, this legal framework was often disregarded in 
practice and neutral states were deeply affected during the Great War and interwar 
period, which was critical for the concept of neutrality. The realist principles, and the 
fact that neutrals did not have access to trade and other services, led to a loss of 
power, the German encirclement being the most famed violation of neutrality. 
In fact, the concept of neutrality has evolved over the centuries. Legally codified as 
impartiality, it took a realist turn with the events of World War II. It is clear nowadays 
that there cannot be a single rule that covers neutrality and the way in which a country 
should be able to protect itself. Neutral, small states were able to survive even in a 
war scenario, avoiding conflict by their own realism and practicality. Throughout the 
Great War, the Norwegian economy rose and fell with great speed. During this time, 
not only did the German demand for imports boost domestic production, but Norway 
also then became a hub for the trans-shipment of overseas goods. Strom explains in 
his contribution (Chapter 8) how the British government’s failure to implement a 
coordinated system of blockade may explain how this could happen, in spite of the 
best efforts of the Entente. The Norwegian government implemented policies that had 
been made in the prewar era. However, in 1914, the British government controlled the 
connections between Norway and the West. Therefore, the British government would 
have had full power to overrule a Norwegian policy in order to avoid direct 
engagement with the blockade. Once the British government began implementing 
effective blockade measures, it was only a matter of time before Norway would 
become fully integrated into the blockade mounted by Germany. 
Golson’s second contribution (Chapter 9, with Jason Lennard), which centers on 
the study of Swedish economic and business performance during World War I, 
focuses on the importance of the Great War in the economic history of Sweden. The 
chapter proceeds with a microeconomic perspective to show how the war affected the 
economy at the level of an individual firm and how “the golden age” of the Swedish 
economy developed. Ball bearings manufacturer SKF saw a healthy boost and 
eventual longevity through international capital investment, vertical integration, the 
expansion of subsidiaries, and control of the Conrad ball bearings patent. The authors 
review the impact of World War I on the entire Swedish economy and Swedish 
businesses, as well as the flourishing movement and growth of SKF. The Swedish 
economy placed itself in context with the economic and business development of the 
time. Sweden’s neutrality in this era is often overlooked or understated, but not in this 
chapter. This new study applies previous theories with updated statistics to the SKF 
case study. The SKF case during the war is unique because of the growth of 
competition against the company, but the extent of SKF’s growth, in spite of all that 
was going against it, makes it intriguing to delve into. This study extends into both the 
Swedish economy and its business to demonstrate how dependent on the progress of 
Swedish businesses and how closely interlinked it was with the war. World War I was 
a pivotal time for the recognition of Swedish industry in international markets and set 
the tone for many years – well into the 1920s and beyond. 
In the wake of World War I, the Nordic countries suffered only mildly, and 
generally recovered quickly. However, in Chapter 10, on the Nordic countries during 
the two world wars, Lennard and Golson discuss how much more they suffered in the 
second. They saw almost twice as much loss of output as they had seen during the 
Great Depression. Still, much of the lost economic activity in the wartime current 
accounts was mitigated when trade quickly increased afterwards. Meanwhile, 
countries such as Finland suffered in both wars. Isolation from traditional trading 
partners appears to have been a contributing factor to its losses. While the focus of 
this chapter is the short-run implications of the world wars on the Nordic economies, 
the long-run impacts were also a factor. Lennard and Golson provide a comprehensive 
methodology for measuring the economic effect of wars based on the cost of crisis in 
terms of lost output. 
During the Cold War, the control of exports, especially protecting them from the 
influence of the Soviet bloc in the Eastern European countries, was extremely 
difficult. In Chapter 11, Jensen-Eriksen points out how much some of the officials and 
companies of the neutral countries wanted to limit the flow of militarily useful goods 
eastwards. Informal links and agreements made under the radar maintained the 
appearance of neutrality. This is why, Jensen-Eriksen says, it is important to look at 
low-level interaction. This study suggests that there was very little some countries 
could do about the field of export controls to the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union, for 
example, could have used items embargoed by the Western alliance to help 
undermine the embargo itself. This underlines the fact that, the US in the early Cold 
War was not strong enough to totally eliminate the impulse to reap benefits from 
being declared neutral. Some of the neutrals believed that the strategic Western 
embargo was not an “East versus West” issue. It was a threat that forced neutral 
countries to curtail their exports of strategic goods, which sometimes came from the 
USA. Therefore, it had a major “West versus West” impact. They were concerned that 
they would have economic sanctions imposed on them or be shamed by their efforts 
to stay out of the global confrontation. Throughout this chapter, Jensen-Eriksen 
explores the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. 
In Chapter 12, the conclusion of this volume Jari Ojala and Toshiaki Tamaki 
discuss some of the findings and contributions of the book, as well as offering ideas 
for future research. This volume is just the first step in the process of reassessing the 
role and importance of smaller/weaker states in world trade, conflicts, and economic 
outcomes. Our assertion is that their role has been under-studied and underestimated. 
These nations were key players in the economic and political networks that functioned 
in the peripheries of the conflicts and of trade, when in many of these conflicts the 
peripheries were the only places for trading. The great powers had to dedicate their 
resources to protecting their own trade routes and/or imposing blockades, but they 
still needed the key commodities. Neutrality was a key tool for the smaller states to 
explore and exploit these opportunities over time. 
As we have said, here we have just scratched the surface of the research 
opportunities that might be seized, as Patrick O’Brien also points out in his kind 
Foreword. First of all, we need a larger set of country studies to examine the bilateral 
and multilateral trade flows over longer periods of time, especially to develop large-
scale databases for comparisons. Second, as in this volume, our approach is still too 
much dominated by European historical cases and descendants of the British Empire – 
we need a broader coverage of different world regions, and a better balance between 
colonial mother countries and the colonies themselves. Third, we need comprehensive 
long-run data on these states, to engage in deeper data analysis, so we can also 
quantitatively test the ideas explored here. Fourth, we see a dichotomy between the 
smaller/weaker states and the type of state capacity they had, when it came to 
conflicts and trade, in various historical contingencies. Finally, we need deeper 
analyses of the types of conflict they were involved in and the economic 
consequences of these conflicts, which would link our analyses with the larger 
literature of state capacity, fiscal states, long-run trade, the economic history of 
conflicts, and the long-run macroeconomic development of polities. 
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